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Anger and optimism are coexisting themes related to the growing liberalization 
of international trade and the resultant transforming forces of globalization. 
While international trade and globalization offer the world community many 
benefits, there also appear to be negative consequences, particularly for least 
developed countries (LDCs). With increased trade and globalization has come 
an uneven distribution of the costs and benefits. This appears to have 
exacerbated inequalities of wealth and power within and between countries. 
The result is asymmetric interdependence where certain countries seem to 
prosper while others suffer. If trade is to benefit the LDCs and their poor 
constituents, more must be done to make them full and equal participants in the 
world economy. Particularly in the agricultural sector and the clothing and 
textiles sector, the industrialized countries need to remove their trade barriers 
in order for the LDCs to accrue the benefits of free trade and market 
liberalization. By fully embracing trade liberalization, the industrialized 
countries could allow the LDCs to realize substantial economic gains and 
move millions of people to positions above the poverty line. Thus, the 
reduction of trade barriers is an obligation of the industrialized countries if 
they wish the LDCs to prosper – as other nations have – in the new global 
economy. In promoting worldwide trade liberalization, the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) plays a crucial role. However, considering that the bulk 
of world trade is still between industrialized nations, and that the biggest WTO 
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decisions have little or nothing to do with LDCs, the WTO may not be the best 
forum for promoting a comprehensive understanding of developing-world 
issues. Similarly, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(World Bank) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) can play important, 
but limited, roles in resolving developing-world issues. The United Nations 
provides a more natural forum in which to address the unique problems and 
concerns of LDCs. As a network of governments, the UN is better equipped for 
knowledge exchange, advocacy, and fair hearing of the problems plaguing the 
developing world. It is also a better source of legitimacy than are international 
financial institutions (IFIs). These characteristics provide the UN with the 
moral authority necessary to effect change to the benefit of LDCs. 
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here is both anger and optimism over the growing liberalization of international 
trade and the resultant transforming forces of globalization.
1 While international 
trade and globalization offer the world community many benefits, there also appear to 
be negative consequences, particularly for least developed countries (LDCs). With 
increased trade and globalization has come an uneven distribution of the costs and 
benefits. This appears to have exacerbated inequalities of wealth and power within 
and between countries. The result is asymmetric interdependence where certain 
countries seem to prosper while others suffer. Simply producing the gains from 
increased international trade is insufficient; a more equitable international trading 
system is necessary to allow LDCs to share in its benefits.  
If trade is to benefit the LDCs and their poor constituents, more must be done to 
make them full and equal participants in the world economy. Particularly in the 
agricultural sector and the clothing and textiles sector, the industrialized countries 
need to remove their trade barriers in order for the LDCs to accrue the benefits of free 
trade and market liberalization. Domestic market support, import quotas, tariffs, and 
export subsidies in industrialized countries have greatly hampered the LDCs’ crucial 
agricultural and clothing and textile exports to industrialized markets. Eliminating 
trade barriers on these items would put the poorest populations of the world in a much 
more favourable economic position. By fully embracing trade liberalization, the 
industrialized countries could allow the LDCs to realize substantial economic gains 
and move millions of people to positions above the poverty line. Thus, the reduction 
of trade barriers is an obligation of the industrialized countries if they wish the LDCs 
to prosper – as other nations have – in the new global economy.  
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In promoting worldwide trade liberalization, the World Trade Organization, which 
oversees multilateral trade arrangements, plays a crucial role. It is able to goad rich 
and poor countries alike into reducing or eliminating trade barriers. However, 
considering that the bulk of world trade is still between industrialized nations, and that 
the biggest WTO decisions have little or nothing to do with LDCs, the WTO may not 
be the best forum for promoting a comprehensive understanding of developing-world 
issues. Similarly, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World 
Bank) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) can play important, but limited, 
roles in resolving developing-world issues. The United Nations (UN) provides a more 
natural forum in which to address the unique problems and concerns of LDCs. The 
UN is a natural nexus for international discussions and action beyond the narrower 
realms of international trade and finance. As a network of governments, the UN is 
better equipped for knowledge exchange, advocacy and fair hearing of the problems 
plaguing the developing world. It is also a better source of legitimacy than are 
international financial institutions (IFIs). These characteristics provide the UN with 
the moral authority necessary to effect change to the benefit of LDCs.  
Sharing the Gains from Trade 
B 
oth academic theory and history support the notion that countries generally 
benefit economically with free trade.
2 Although some theories precede events, 
international trade developed centuries ago, long before any trade theories had 
evolved. Trade among the city-states throughout the Mediterranean region, for 
example, predates recorded trade theories by more than 2000 years.
3 While ancient 
city-states realized material benefits from trade, the primary argument for 
international trade was not advanced until 1817, by David Ricardo. In his Principles 
of Political Economy, Ricardo advocated a set of propositions that are still utilized by 
today’s free trade advocates and policymakers. According to Ricardo, it is mutually 
beneficial for countries to specialize in the production of those goods that they can 
produce most efficiently, that is, goods in which they have a comparative (or relative) 
advantage.
4 These goods should then be traded for the goods of other nations. The 
policy implication is that liberalization of international trade will increase the welfare 
of citizens throughout the world. In other words, international trade, in theory, is not a 
“zero-sum” game in which one country benefits at the expense of another country.
5 
Rather, unhindered international trade could provide benefits to all participating 
countries, rich and poor alike.  
Although the theory of comparative advantage is not without its deficiencies and 
critics, it has provided economists and policymakers throughout the world with a 
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powerful intellectual basis for promoting free trade among nations.
6 Interestingly, on 
the basis of Ricardo’s theory, it would be expected that most trade should occur 
among dissimilar countries. For example, in theory, there should be increased trade 
activity between an industrialized country and an LDC, or between a temperate 
country in the north and a tropical one in the south. The greater the dissimilarity 
among countries, the greater the potential for trade. Countries with great differences in 
climatic conditions, labour, or capital will differ in the types of products they can 
produce relatively more efficiently. These national differences should affect the degree 
to which products move from one country to another. In other words, international 
free trade should provide all countries with the means to help optimize world 
economic output and raise income levels for all participants in the long run. In theory, 
the LDCs should be in a position to benefit from trade. Observations of actual trade 
patterns, however, reveal that most of the world’s trade takes place between countries 
with similar characteristics. Specifically, trade has tended to occur among the 
industrialized nations, which have relatively educated populations and skilled labour 
forces and are located in northern temperate areas of the globe. For example, the 
United States is the world’s largest single trader, and eight of the ten largest export 
markets are also the top ten destinations for U.S. imports.
7 Nine of the ten largest U.S. 
export and import partners are industrialized countries.
8 At the global level, all ten of 
the largest importing and exporting nations are industrialized countries.
9 It would thus 
appear not only that trade theory is at odds with actual trade practice, but also, more 
importantly, the LDCs have generally been unable to participate in the gains available 
from international trade.  
Even if trade does take place primarily between countries with similar economic 
characteristics, the following question remains pertinent: does increased international 
trade, (even among similar countries) facilitate economic growth? Critics of 
international trade and globalization have frequently pointed to studies which have 
demonstrated that, despite the adoption of free trade policies by most countries of the 
world, the income gap between the LDCs and the industrialized countries has 
increased in the past few decades.
10 This suggests that the rise in liberal trade policies 
around the globe has benefited the industrialized countries at the expense of the 
LDCs. There have been a few successes, notably a number of developing countries in 
East Asia, and the transition economies of China, India, and Uganda.
11 However, from 
the LDC perspective it appears that increased trade widens the gap between wealthy 
industrialized nations and the poor LDCs. Thus, it would seem that free trade is 
skewed in favour of the industrialized world.  
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In support of the position that globalization is increasing financial inequality is the 
widely cited UN Human Development Report. The 1999 issue states the following:  
Gaps between the poorest and the richest people and countries have 
continued to widen. In 1960, 20% of the world’s people in the richest 
countries had 30 times the income of the poorest 20%; in 1997, 74 times as 
much. This continues the trend of nearly two centuries. Some have 
predicted convergence, but the past decade has shown increasing 
concentration of income among people, corporations and countries.
12  
According to the UN, this global inequality has worsened within countries; it has 
also worsened across countries.
13 Other studies support the view that there is an 
increasing income gap leading to, in the words of one economist, “divergence, big-
time”.
14 Clearly, over the past 30 years, the industrial nations have grown richer, while 
most of the very poorest of the LDCs have stayed poor.
15 Critics of globalization 
blame these disturbing trends on the neo-liberal policies imposed by the WTO, the 
World Bank, and the IMF. The Human Development Report continues:  
National and international economic policies shifted sharply in the 1970s 
and 1980s towards more reliance on the market-diminishing role of the 
state. By 1997, India had reduced its tariffs from an average of 82% in 
1990 to 30%, Brazil from 25% to 12% and China from 43% to 18%. 
Driven by technocrats, the changes were supported by the IMF and the 
World Bank as part of comprehensive economic reform and liberalization 
packages. Conditions for membership to the WTO were important 
incentives. Country after country undertook deep unilateral liberalization, 
not just in trade but in foreign investment. These changes have sped the 
pace of globalization and deepened the interactions among people. The 
new rules of globalization focus on integrating global markets, neglecting 
the needs of people that markets cannot meet. The process is concentrating 
power and marginalizing the poor, both countries and people.
16  
 
If disparity in the world’s income distribution has widened over the last few 
decades, such widening would seem to suggest that increasing trade and globalization 
provide few, if any, benefits – at least to the LDCs; otherwise, the LDCs would be 
much more motivated to integrate their individual economies into the global economy 
as the WTO, IMF, World Bank, and industrialized countries advocate. However, the 
trade and globalization issue is much more complex. The reasons for global inequality 
are many, and some have little connection with trade. Poverty in various parts of the 
world is the result of a range of causes that includes not only poor weather, but also 
corrupt and ineffective government. All of the 25 poorest nations on earth are badly 
governed.
17 In many countries, individuals are not allowed to own land and lack basic 
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property rights. In the poorest of the LDCs there are also unenforceable contracts, 
microeconomic instability, civil unrest or war, and predatory government regimes.
18 
To add to the complexity of the issue, global inequality has also increased for 
reasons related to trade. First, the economies of industrialized countries have grown at 
a much faster rate than those of the LDCs.
19 Second, population growth in the LDCs 
outpaces that in countries belonging to the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD).
20 Third, there is slow growth of economic output in rural 
China, rural India, and Africa.
21 Fourth, the income of urban China has grown rapidly, 
which has widened the income gap with rural China.
22 Finally, technological 
advancements and financial services liberalization have resulted in a disproportionate 
increase in the number of individuals at the wealthy end of the spectrum, without a 
reduction in the numbers at the poor end.
23 Furthermore, population growth adds 
disproportionately to the number of individuals living near or at the poverty line. 
Perhaps it is for this reason that the World Bank’s World Development Report for 2000 
states that rising income inequality “should not be seen as a negative”, as long as 
incomes of the poor do not fall and the number of people living in poverty does fall.
24  
Statistics can be utilized with great effect to support either side of the 
globalization debate. However, it must be noted that even though within-country 
inequality and across-country inequality are increasing, it does not necessarily follow 
that global inequality overall is increasing.
25 For example, consider the case where 
five-sixths of the world’s population lives in poor LDCs, while one-sixth lives in 
wealthier industrialized nations. In across-country terms, there is a great divergence in 
wealth. If one poor but highly populated country starts to experience economic 
growth, inequality within this same country would worsen somewhat. Statistically, in 
spite of its size, this country would have little effect on across-country comparisons: 
the rapid growth in wealth would not be great enough to affect divergence 
measurements. For example, China is a populous country and its economy is growing 
at a fast rate. Inequality within China will worsen on average, as some sectors of the 
economy remain stagnant (mostly rural) while others sectors (largely urban) witness 
rapidly rising incomes. At the same time, overall inequality, if measured across all the 
people in the world, would fall. In fact, when across-country measures of divergence 
are weighted by population, there is not a rising trend of inequality, but rather the 
opposite: a convergence of global incomes.
26 Thus, contrarily, global income 
disparities, studied over seven of the most popular measures of income inequality over 
the last two decades, show a significant decline.
27 Based on this information, 
increased international trade and globalization are already providing the LDCs with 
certain, albeit marginal, benefits.  
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Not only has the world as a whole become wealthier during the recent 
globalization period, but also the large group of people living near the poverty line has 
been shrinking since 1970.
28 The one-dollar-a-day poverty rate has fallen from 20 
percent of the world’s population to 5 percent over the last 25 years.
29 Furthermore, 
the two-dollars-a-day poverty rate has fallen from 44 percent of the world’s 
population to 18 percent.
30 By 1998, there were between 300 and 500 million fewer 
people living in poverty when compared to the 1970s.
31 The absolute number of 
people living in poverty is declining by about 5 million a year, but that still leaves 
about 800 million people hungry.
32 Most of the impoverished – 95 percent of the 
world’s poor – live in Africa.
33 This large concentration of poverty in Africa suggests 
that the lack of economic growth on that continent is one of the most serious issues in 
the globalization debate. It would seem that the best strategy to reduce poverty and 
inequality is to induce aggregate economic growth and development, especially within 
the poorest of the LDCs.  
Multinational corporations (MNCs) have often been cited as the “engines of 
development” throughout the world.
34 An opposing view has been critical of MNCs, 
stressing the negative impact of these organizations, especially on LDCs.
35 These 
critics contest the alleged socio-economic benefits for LDCs from MNC investment 
and activity. Indeed, some studies of LDC development, especially those in Latin 
America, have shown that MNCs have had negative consequences in certain 
economies: they eliminated more jobs than they created; acquired local capital without 
providing foreign capital; harmed local entrepreneurs; violated human rights and 
harmed the environment; and provided inappropriate technology for the needs of the 
local economy.
36 In sum, MNCs have done more harm than good, at least in some 
LDCs.  
MNCs are a powerful global force. They clearly have the ability to wreak havoc 
on a small LDC economy but they can also help to drive growth. Consider that 51 of 
the largest 100 “economies” in the world are MNCs, and the top 500 MNCs account 
for about 70 percent of the world’s trade.
37 Ninety-nine of the 100 largest MNCs are 
also based in OECD nations.
38 The sheer size of many MNCs should be of concern to 
anyone involved in the globalization debate, especially the LDCs. The larger MNCs 
obviously enjoy considerable power in negotiating business arrangements with 
governments. In fact, the outcome of such negotiations can be of a greater 
consequence to an LDC than many of its treaties with other countries.  
In broad terms, the primary criticism of MNCs is that they are not concerned with 
national societal interests due to their global perspective and worldwide base of 
operations. While this criticism is not without its merits, MNCs in general have helped 
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to drive growth in many LDCs. One study of 52 LDCs over the period from 1983 to 
1990 found there to be a positive correlation between MNC activity and economic and 
social development.
39 Furthermore, where MNCs fostered economic development in 
terms of foreign direct investment, employment, and income in these LDCs, 
improvements in political and civil rights are noted.
40 Thus, not only are MNCs 
associated with increased development, they are also positively associated with 
improved human rights. Although the effects of MNCs on LDCs may be open to 
debate on many dimensions, MNCs appear to be able to contribute to LDC growth 
and employment by enabling idle resources to be used and by using country-based 
resources more efficiently.  
Including the LDCs in Trade 
  N
otwithstanding some of the negative consequences for LDCs, and their recent 
experiences with globalization, there is strong evidence to support the argument 
that, overall, LDCs can benefit from increased trade. The need to bring the world’s 
poor and deprived into the global economy is manifest. There is growing public 
concern that not enough is being done to address worldwide poverty and poverty-
related social illnesses such as poor working conditions, civil strife, human rights 
violations, and the degradation of the environment. While the linkages between trade 
and poverty per se are not as direct and immediate as the linkages between poverty 
and national policies (such as health care, education, governance, etc.), trade can 
affect the income opportunities of the poor in a number of ways. Some of these may 
be negative, but trade liberalization can be, overall, a positive contributor to poverty 
alleviation. As already noted, increased trade allows individuals to maximize their 
productive potential and it assists LDCs in economic growth.  
There is much at stake in forging a new global trade policy that is more inclusive 
of the LDCs. The World Bank has estimated that the elimination of all trade barriers 
alone would increase global income by US$2.8 trillion and lift 320 million people out 
of poverty by 2015.
41 Removal of agricultural product subsidies in the OECD 
countries could provide the LDCs with three times the amount of overseas 
development assistance (ODA) they currently receive.
42 Complete trade liberalization 
in all sectors in the OECD nations would benefit the LDCs by almost eight times their 
ODA.
43 The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
Trade and Development Report for 1999 estimates that in the low-technology 
industries, the LDCs are missing out on $700 billion in export earnings as a result of 
trade barriers.
44 This represents about four times the average annual foreign direct 
investment (FDI) influx into the LDCs during the 1990s.
45  
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It would appear that the LDCs may be able to grow their way out of poverty and 
into the more prosperous global economy. If so, trade can serve as the primary engine 
in that growth. Unfortunately, the LDCs remain skeptical that trade is their best hope 
for development. They have become cynical about the industrialized world’s 
commitment to liberalized trade. The LDCs have good reason: the United States and 
Europe have been pushing the issue on the need for them to open their markets, yet 
they have effectively kept out many poor-country exports. In 1993, when the Uruguay 
Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was completed, it was 
felt that the LDCs would benefit most.
46 In hindsight, the LDCs have arrived at the 
belief that the industrialized countries have failed to deliver on the commitments they 
made under the Uruguay Round and that certain GATT and subsequent WTO 
provisions have, in practice, proved to be counterproductive.  
The LDCs are justified in their assertion that they have not realized the promised 
benefits of liberalized trade as expected under the Uruguay Round. Industrialized 
countries cut their tariffs by less in the Uruguay Round than did the LDCs. Since then, 
industrialized countries, notably the United States and Europe, have found new ways 
to close their markets, primarily by imposing antidumping duties on imports that are 
deemed to be unreasonably low-priced. Furthermore, the OECD nations are especially 
protectionist in many of the sectors where the LDCs are best able to compete, such as 
agriculture and textiles and clothing. As a result, according to one study, OECD 
average tariffs on manufacturing imports from LDCs are four times higher than those 
on such imports from other OECD countries.
47 This difference imposes a hefty burden 
on these poor nations.  
Finally, the LDCs are also handicapped by a lack of technical expertise in 
economics and trade-related matters. Many had a poor understanding of the issues 
encompassed in the Uruguay Round. That ignorance has been extremely costly. 
According to one estimate, simply implementing the Uruguay GATT commitments to 
improve trade procedures and establish technical and intellectual property standards 
has cost more than a year’s development budget for the poorest LDCs.
48  
Much can be done to include the LDCs in the benefits available through trade. 
Fortunately, many governments, trade supporters and critics understand that certain 
adjustments to the GATT/WTO rules are needed if the trading system is to realistically 
reflect and address the inequalities of the world. With the most recent multilateral 
trade round, launched at Doha, Qatar, in November 2001, came recognition that the 
LDCs need to become full members in the global economy – and they need assistance 
to get there. A starting point that Doha recognizes is that technical assistance and 
capacity building are essential to assist LDCs to implement GATT/WTO rules and 
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obligations. In many cases in the past, in areas where LDCs could have benefited from 
GATT/WTO trade rules, they were unable to do so because of poor financial resources 
and lack of expertise.
49 The WTO has helped some LDCs to win trade disputes against 
OECD nations. For example, Costa Rica is now able to sell clothing more easily in the 
United States, and Ecuador can now export more bananas to Europe.
50 However, in 
1999, of the WTO’s 134 members, 29 were unable to afford missions to the WTO 
headquarters in Geneva.
51  
During the 1990s the WTO did little to help LDCs with technical assistance. In 
1999 its yearly budget for technical assistance was only CHF741,000 (US$480,000), 
and rules bar the WTO from distributing these funds to help countries bring cases 
against each other.
52 More recently, in a push to include LDCs in the world trading 
system, the WTO has made greater efforts to assist LDCs to adjust to WTO rules and 
disciplines, implement obligations, and exercise the rights of membership.
53 Since 
1999 the value of the WTO’s technical assistance program has risen dramatically. In 
2002, for example, the WTO budget for technical assistance increased to CHF30 
million (US$20 million).
54 This money is crucial to the effective participation of 
LDCs in the multilateral trading system. It helps them to train negotiators, build 
efficient customs regimes, and reinforce their capacity to understand and formulate 
effective trade policy. In this way, LDCs will become better equipped to participate in 
the work of the WTO and thus benefit from the liberal, rules-based multilateral 
trading system. 
However, it must be noted that the WTO is not a development body. For an 
international organization, the WTO is relatively small and has a modest number of 
staff members. It also has a modest budget. The WTO exists to administer trade law, 
settle disputes, assess GATT/WTO treaty compliance and provide a forum for trade 
negotiations. As the WTO’s budget comes from member states, the organization 
should not be relied upon to lead – nor criticized for not leading – the development 
charge. 
The WTO ministerial conference at Doha recognized that the products of the 
LDCs still face many obstacles to entering the markets of industrialized nations. A 
strong message put forth by the developing world is that the industrialized countries 
need to do more to reduce trade-distorting subsidies and dismantle their existing 
barriers to competitive exports from the LDCs. Thus, a basic priority of the 
international trade community must be to create conditions, beyond provision of 
technical assistance, in which the LDCs can maximize the gains they are able to 
secure from trade.  
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Including the developing world in the benefits of trade requires action in at least 
two key sectors: 1) agriculture and 2) textiles and clothing. While the Uruguay Round 
made significant contributions to the liberalization of international trade, the post-
Uruguay world trading environment still contains distortions in a number of sectors. 
One feature of the current environment is that while average tariff levels have 
dropped dramatically since the Uruguay Round, this average masks the much higher 
rates applied to imports in a few sensitive sectors. One of the areas where extensive 
impediments to trade exist is the agricultural sector. Unfortunately for the LDCs, 
agriculture is one of the most important sectors of their developing economies and 
remains one of the most difficult areas for trade policy in the industrialized world; it is 
also one area in which trade liberalization can still yield enormous benefits. The 
poorest members of the population in virtually any LDC live in rural areas and depend 
on a sustainable and productive agricultural sector for even meagre incomes. For 
about 50 LDCs, agriculture accounts for over one-third of export earnings, and for 
almost 40 developing countries, it represents about 50 percent.
55 Yet trade in 
agricultural products is still impeded by significant obstacles imposed by OECD 
nations. According to the WTO, support in the form of subsidies alone to the 
agricultural sector in OECD nations averages about $1 billion a day.
56 To use another 
example, the $2 billion the United States spends on cotton subsidies each year is 
worth more than the total cotton production of sub-Saharan Africa.
57 Similarly, the $2 
billion the European Union spends on subsidizing sugar, which is another important 
crop in the developing world, seems equally perverse.
58 Such massive support forces 
even the most efficient LDC producers out of markets where they would otherwise be 
able to compete. The OECD itself notes the counterproductive effect of these 
subsidies. It states: “…such protection continues to be regressive as it mainly benefits 
large firms and impacts most strongly on low-income consumers for whom food 
constitutes a large share of their total household expenditure.”
59  
Under the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, members are obliged to limit and 
reduce the volume and value of export subsidies.
60 In addition, the use of new export 
subsidies is prohibited. Still, the post-Uruguay levels of export subsidies that will 
continue to be allowed at the end of the implementation period are close to $13 billion 
a year.
61 While much work needs to be done to make the LDCs equal partners in 
global trade, the reduction of subsidies to OECD agricultural sectors is a positive step.  
Another key area where LDCs can realize the benefits of trade is in textiles and 
clothing. This sector is the largest export earner for many LDCs, but protectionist 
trade distortions have plagued this area for the last three decades. Under the 1995 
WTO Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC), Canada, the United States, and 
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Europe continue to maintain restrictions on imports of textiles and clothing from 
LDCs.
62 Before the ATC, a large portion of textiles and clothing exports from poor 
countries were subject to quotas under a special arrangement outside normal GATT 
rules. The LDCs have argued for years that import barriers by a number of OECD 
nations in this sector represent a major impediment to their economic development. 
Fortunately, with the ATC, non-tariff barrier quotas will be fully phased out by 2005. 
This timeline is to allow a number of industrialized countries to adjust in this sector. 
After phase-out, as the quotas come to an end, the importing countries will no longer 
be able to discriminate between exporting countries. However, trade in textiles and 
clothing will still be impeded by the relatively high tariffs in the main importing 
countries. The bound tariff currently averages 8 percent, but there are many peaks 
within this average.
63 Despite low average tariffs for industrialized-country products, 
the products in which LDCs are globally competitive – from the agricultural and 
textiles and clothing sectors – will likely continue to attract relatively high tariffs. 
Furthermore, developed countries are more inclined to utilize antidumping measures 
to negate any gains on textiles that LDCs might obtain from the elimination of 
existing restrictive import regimes in that sector. These remaining barriers to trade for 
LDCs must be eliminated if LDCs are to be given the opportunity to develop 
economically.  
International Institutions for the Developing World 
T 
he WTO as well as the IMF and the World Bank, inter alia, play significant roles 
in furthering trade and globalization. The multilateral treaties signed under 
GATT/WTO, and the operations of the IMF and the World Bank, have effectively 
promoted economic policies and processes associated with globalization: market 
liberalization, privatization, and the creation of legal regimes facilitating economic 
transactions and FDI. However, although the WTO, IMF and World Bank operate on 
the premise that their promotion of trade and economic activities will advance human 
welfare, equity, and social justice, especially in developing countries, these issues are 
not the explicit concerns of these institutions. Therefore, the commitment these 
institutions have to bettering human welfare around the globe is limited. Advancing 
human welfare, particularly within LDCs, involves issues and programs well beyond 
the narrower confines of trade and economic policy. While the WTO and IFIs have an 
important, but limited, role in promoting developing-world issues, the UN and its 
related organs are better equipped to meet the multidimensional challenges facing the 
LDCs.  
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The primary function of the WTO is to further the development (and enforcement) 
of the multilateral trading system along the principles followed by the eight rounds of 
trade negotiations concluded under the GATT regime. There is no doubt that 
GATT/WTO has helped to boost global trade. As the UN Regional Commissions 
Development Update notes, “trade creates wealth.”
64 World exports have increased 
from US$60 billion in 1950 to $5,300 billion in 1998, or about 20 percent of the 
world’s output. GATT/WTO has been a necessary precondition to enable this 
growth.
65  
While the GATT/WTO has promoted global economic growth, the institution has 
faced increasing criticism. The harshest critics argue that the WTO is an undemocratic 
institution, secretive, and unresponsive to the needs of the poor. The words of 
CorpWatch are representative: “[s]upposedly each of the WTO’s 131 member 
countries have an equal say in governance. In practice, decision-making is dominated 
by the ‘Quad’: USA; European Union; Japan and Canada.”
66 To make matters worse, 
“[e]ach member of the Quad represents its corporations’ interest at the WTO. These 
corporations are often directly involved” in making and enforcing WTO rules.
67 The 
idea that the WTO represents big business, takes advantage of LDCs, and tramples on 
the rights and interests of workers and environmentalists is widely circulated.
68 If the 
WTO is seen as a tool of “unknown and mysterious multinationals,” as the European 
Union’s trade commissioner notes, this view is based primarily on ignorance. The 
WTO is more democratic than are the IMF and the World Bank: each country enjoys 
an equal vote. The WTO’s dispute mechanism and bargaining rules are largely 
transparent. However, the WTO is not an institution primarily concerned with global 
governance or the social or economic development of poorer nations. Its mandate is to 
promote trade. Thus, while the WTO can play an important role in promoting trade as 
an engine of development for LDCs, this is not – nor should it be – its main function.   
Since their founding at Bretton Woods in 1944, the IMF and the World Bank 
Group
69 (World Bank) have played vital roles in fostering globalization throughout the 
world. Like the WTO and the UN, these are the main institutions that govern 
globalization. While the IMF and the World Bank each have a different focus, they 
seek to promote international development through long-term capital investment 
(World Bank) or ensure global economic stability through short-term lending to 
governments experiencing temporary economic downturns and balance of payments 
problems (IMF). As these institutions have evolved, they have become more 
committed to the neo-liberal economic policies of structural economic reform, 
privatization, capital-market liberalization, and deregulation as a means of achieving 
development. This commitment suggests that these international institutions may not 
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be the most suitable bodies for addressing developing-country issues. Since the early 
1980s, for example, the IMF has imposed structural adjustment programs on more 
than 70 countries as a condition of financial assistance. These measures have been 
dubbed the “Washington Consensus” of policies for developing-country prosperity.
70 
For example, structural adjustment policies have required 36 countries in Africa – 
where the majority of people live in poverty – to decrease domestic consumption and 
shift scarce resources into the production of cash crops for export.
71 Privatization of 
government-owned companies and government services has been imposed, as well as 
cuts in education and health care expenditures. From the perspective of the LDCs, 
structural reforms imposed by the IMF and the World Bank appear to enhance the 
power and mobility of international capital, while diminishing capital regulations in 
an attempt to attract FDI. For the LDCs, these pressures create complex and 
contradictory demands. As one academic notes, “[o]n the one hand, the [World] Bank 
furthers the process of globalization that undermines the third world state; on the 
other, the Bank simultaneously allocates to the state responsibility of securing the 
basics of social welfare for its people and, hence, of addressing and in some measure 
resolving the problem of globalization.”
72 
Not surprisingly, structural adjustment policies imposed by the IMF and the World 
Bank have elicited protests in numerous LDCs.
73 The frustration is not unjustified. 
Numerous structural adjustment programs have failed, leading Horst Kohler, the head 
of the IMF, to admit that numerous failures, most recently in Latin America, “suggest 
that we still have a lot to learn.”
74 Other governmental bodies have been more critical 
of the IMF and World Bank. A bipartisan U.S. Congressional committee, the Meltzer 
Commission, found that IMF and World Bank failures are the result of “overlapping 
missions, ineffectiveness, corruption, and waste of resources, and failure to develop 
successful regional programs in agriculture, forestry, environment and health care.”
75 
It is possible that the IMF and the World Bank are themselves to blame for a litany of 
LDC failures. Perhaps they push countries into structural reform, privatization, and 
capital-market liberalization prematurely. Even some of the IMF’s own economists 
have recently acknowledged the risks involved in free foreign capital flows for 
LDCs.
76 In any event, as international financial institutions, the IMF and the World 
Bank appear to be ill equipped to deal comprehensively with developing-country 
issues. Considering the complexity of the needs of LDCs, the resolution of their 
structural problems is more suited to the resources available through the UN. 
There is growing awareness that certain development strategies promoted by the 
WTO, IMF, and World Bank have limitations. The issues of development are 
extremely complex and extend beyond the realm of economics and perhaps beyond 
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the full understanding of commercially focused international institutions. In order to 
assist LDCs to prevent and overcome negative effects of globalization – and reap its 
benefits – the international community needs to devise more comprehensive 
development strategies and policies, taking into account development’s social, human, 
and environmental dimensions in addition to its economic dimension. The UN and its 
related bodies can play a leading role in this regard.  
One of the mandates of the UN is to promote higher standards of living, 
employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development around 
the world.
77 As much as 70 percent of the work of the UN system is devoted to 
accomplishing this mandate.
78 This work is based on the premise that eradicating 
poverty and improving the social and economic welfare of people worldwide are 
necessary steps in creating the conditions for peace. The UN has specific strengths 
that equip it to address development issues. Its presence is global and its 
comprehensive mandate spans social, economic, environmental, and emergency 
needs. In addition the UN does not represent any particular national or commercial 
interest. When major development policy decisions are taken, all countries, rich and 
poor, have an equal vote. The UN is also able to pool the efforts of its various related 
bodies to tackle complex problems, like the AIDS epidemic in Africa, which cut 
across organizational areas of expertise and defy the efforts of a country acting alone. 
Not surprisingly, the UN is the primary organization for furthering development in 
LDCs, providing assistance worth more than $30 billion a year.
79 The UN should thus 
remain the focal point of all international efforts to address developing-world issues.  
There are a number of ways in which the UN could expand its role in assisting the 
LDCs that are harmed as a result of trade liberalization. The UN, for example, could 
become more active in helping the LDCs find ways to mitigate the costs, or to adjust, 
in order to take advantage of the economic opportunities that arise from liberalization. 
As already noted, the problem is that, while trade liberalization fosters growth and 
development, it also results in losses for certain economic groups. In essence, some 
sectors of an economy are forced to make disruptive financial sacrifices for the greater 
good of their country and the global economy as a whole. For such hardship, the 
losing parties are usually inadequately compensated. This is where the UN could help. 
While the WTO continues to promote trade liberalization, the UN could provide 
assistance to those groups that are disadvantaged by that liberalization. In more 
specific terms, the UN could expand the role and power of the UN Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Through UNCTAD, there already exists an 
important and influential organ that deals directly with trade and developing countries. 
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In relevant areas, UNCTAD could be given additional responsibility and resources to 
aid transition into the world economy of those hurt by trade liberalization.  
Conclusion 
T 
rade and globalization remain potentially powerful and dynamic forces for 
growth and development, particularly for the LDCs. They can improve the 
overall performance of LDCs’ economies in a number of ways. Trading and 
globalization can: enhance market opportunities for LDC exports; transfer 
information, skills, and technology; and increase the sources available for FDI. 
Maximizing the benefits of trade and globalization requires sound domestic policies as 
well as support at the global level from international institutions. While the WTO, 
IMF, World Bank, and other institutions play an important role in this regard, UN 
leadership is critical for LDC success in this area.  
Including the LDCs in the benefits of globalization requires that the international 
community address the imbalances and asymmetries in the international economy, 
especially in terms of better market access for LDC products. Another concern is that 
globalization has de-linked finance and investment from international trade. This has 
led to high volatility in capital flows and, hence, weakened the capacity of many 
LDCs to effectively manage their integration with the world economy. These negative 
effects also need to be addressed by the international community. Thus, while 
liberalized trade has generated growth, there is still plenty of scope for improvement 
in many areas of export and trade with regard to the LDCs. The efficient functioning 
of a truly non-discriminatory global marketplace would represent an extremely 
significant contribution to the sustained economic growth and sustainable 
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invasion. As used here, “globalization” is broadly defined as the geographical 
shift in domestic economic activity around the world and away from nation states. 
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